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This papcr establishes a simple general cquilib-  when one of the markets, cither the United States
rium trade  model  to estimate  the effects  of the  or the European  Community,  unilaterally  lifts the
Multifibrc Arrangement (MFA) on world trade in  MFA restrictions).
clothing,  especially  on exports  from developing
countries.  * The spillover cf  fect (how much unrestricted
LDCs benefit from the restciCLions  on other
The  MFA,  in effect  for more than  a quarter  LDCs).
of  ecntury, has strongly  influenced  world  trade in
textiles  and  clothing.  Although  intensive  nego-  Domestic  producers  in the developed
tiations  on the abolition  of the  MFA are under  countrics,  especially  those  in the United  States,
way in the Uruguay  Round,  there  is little hope  have benefited  greatly  from  the MFA restric-
for its imminent  demise.  tions.  The value of shipments  of clothing  by
U.S. producers  is more than $3 billion  higher
The  MFA greatly  affects developing  coun-  ($400 million  for EC producers)  than they  would
tries because  the MFA restrictions  are imposed  have been otherwise.  When MFA quotas  and
discriminatively  on the exporLs lrom developing  tariffs are taken  together,  the  value of clothing
countries.  Until very recenitly, however,  the  shipments  by U.S. producers  is $8 billion  higher
emphasis  of empirical  studies of  Lhe  MFA was  ($1.5 billion  lor the EC producers)  than  without
on importing  developed  countries  rather  than  suchi restrictions.
exporting  developing  countries.
The spillover  to unrestricted  developing
One of the main  fcatures  ol the estimation  in  countries  (such as most  Latin  American  coun-
this paper  is its recognitioni of die unr(eruse of  tries) is nmuch  smaller  than of ten  alleged.  The
MFA quotas.  Contrary' to popular  belief,  thc  spillover cffect  to unresiricted  LDCs  is less than
MFA quotas  arc sometimes  not binding  because  $2(X)  million  (or a mere 2 percent  of the value of
the use of Lhe  quotas  is very low.  shipments  by the unrestricted  LDCs).
Although  the structure  ol the model  is simple  But  Lhe  trade-suppressing  effect on the
(two markets  and six groups  of suppliers),  it is  restricted  L[)Cs  (suchi as Hong  Kong and  South
useful  lor analyzing  various  eflbccs ol the ,MI-A,  Korea) is muLh larger  than  that of spillover.  Due
including:  to the MFA,  the value  of the clothing  exports
from restricted  LDCs is suppressed  by more than
* The trade-suppressing  effect (how much  the  $1 billion,  even in the short  run.  In the long run,
clothing  exports  lrom  restricted  LDCs are  after various  adjustmnents, the lost  shipments  of
suppressed  due to the NIFA).  LDCs restricted  by the MFA amount  to more
than  $2 billion.
* The trade-diversion  effect among  markets
(how much  the clothing  impons  are increased
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Affairs Complex.  An objective  of the  series  is to get  thcsc  findings  out quickly, cven  if presentations  arc  less  than  fully
polished.  Thc findings.  interpretations,  and  conclusions  in thcse  papers  do not  necessarily  rcprcscnt  official Bank  policy.
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The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  establish  a  simple  general  equilibrium
trade  model,  and  to  estimate  the  effects  of  the  Multifibre  Arrangement  (MFA)  on
world  c'othing  trade,  especially  on exports  from  developing  countries.
The  MFA  has  been in effect  for  more  than  a quarter  of century,  and,
as  I  sumarized elsewhere  (Goto  (1989)),  it  has  strongly  influenced  world  trade
of  textiles  and  clothing.  Although  intensive  negotiations  are  being  made  on  the
future  abolition  of the  MFA under  the  Uruguay  Round,  there  seems  little  hope
for its imminent  demise. Since  the  MFA ha:e existed  for so many  years,  both
importers  and exporters  of textile  and clothing  products  have been greatly
affected,  and  various  attempts  have  been  made  to estimate  the  magnitude  of the
effects  of the  MFA on developed  and  developing  countries. Obviously,  the  MFA
strongly affects developing countries because the  MFA  restrictions  are
discriminatively  imposed  on  the  exports  from  LDCs.  Until  very  recently,  however,
the emphasis  of the  empirical  studies  of the  MFA  was placed  on the  effects  on
importing  developed  countries  rather  than the  effects  on exporting  developing
countries.
Trela  and  Whalley (1988)  estimated  the  welfare  cost of the MFA to
developing  countries  by using  a rigorous  general  equilibrium  framework. They
showed,  among  others,  that  if  the  MFA  were  removed,  the  developing  countries  as
a  whole  would  gain  by  more  than  3  billion  dollars. Although  their  framework  is
pathbreaking,  there  exists  wide  room  for  improvements.  For  example,  they  assumed
that  every  MFA  quota  is  binding. But,  as  is  shown  later  in  this  paper,  in  many
cases  the  MFA  quotas  are  not fully  utilized,  and  the  quota  utilization  rate  is2
sometimes  as low  as 10-20  percent. The estimation  result  would  be misleading
if such  underutiliz.1  quotas  are  assumed  to  be binding.
In some  sense,  the  present  paper  is  an extension  or complement  of
Trela-Whalley  paper. Although  both  papers  present  estimation  based  on  rigorous
general  equilibrium  framework,  there  are  some  differences  between  the  two. The
major  difference  includes:  (i)  the  present  paper  incorporates  in  the  model  the
additional  realities  like  underutilization  of  quotas;  (ii)  the  emphasis  of the
present  paper  is  placed  on effects  on trade  (especially  exports  from  the  LDCs)
while  in  Trela-Whalley  it  is  on the  effect  on  welfare;  (iii)  the  model  developed
in the  present  paper  is  much simpler  than  that  in  Trela-Whalley;  (iv)  product
differentiation  is  more  emphasized  in  the  present  paper.
In  what follows,  the  outline  of the  model  will  be presented  first,
and in the following  section  the:  data  and detailed  estimation  method  will be
discussed. After  those,  it  will  be estimated  by using  the  model  how  the  world
trade  pattern  of clothing  (especially  clothing  exports  from  the  LDCs)  would  be
affected  if the  MFA  and/or  tariffs  were  removed.
II.  THE  MODEL
1.  Overview
Before  presenting  a rigorous  mathematical  formulation,  it would  be
useful  to summarize  the  outline  of the  model. First  of all, in the  model,  it
is assumed  that  there  are  two  markets  of clothing:  the  U.S.  market  ind the  EC
market. Although  there  are  many other  countries  which import  clothing,  e.g.
Japan,  non-EC  European  countries,  developing  countries  etc.,  the  United  States
and the  European  Community  are the  two  most important  markets  and  they import
major  part  of the  world  clothing. As Table  1  shows,  the  combined  share  of the3
U.S. market  and  the  EC  market  in the  world  imports  of  clothing  is  more than  70
percent.  In  view of the dominance  of the U.S. and the EC, I assume, for
simplicity,  that  there  are  only  two  markets,  the  U.S.  and  the  EC,  of  the  clothing
trade.
Tabljej: SHARE  OF SELECTED  IMPORTERS
IN  WORLD  CLOTHING  TRADE
1985  1986  1987  1988
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
U.S.A.  34.1  30.9  28.4  27.9
EC  36.8  41.9  43.5  43.8
JAPAN  4.2  4.8  6.0  8.2
LDC  8.7  '.4  6.5  6.7
Other  16.1  -.O  15.7  13.4
Source:  United  Nations  Trade  Statistics.
Table  2:  CLOTHING  IMPORTS  BY SOURCE
USA  EC
Source  Value  Share  Value  Share
($million)  (X)  ($million)  (X)
Total  18,692  100.0  13,308  100.0
USA  - - 149  1.1
EC  1,640  8.8  - -
LDC  16,246  86.9  12,558  94.4
Other  806  4.3  601  4.5
Note: Excluding  intra-EC  trade
Source:  United  Nations  Trade  Statistics4
Secondly,  both  markets  are  assumed  to  be supplied  by the  U.S. producers,
the  EC producers,  and  LDC  proki,.cers.  Again,  there  are  other  producers  in the
world,  such  as  Japanese  producers  and  Swedish  producers.  But,  as  shown  in  Table
2, in the U.S. market  and the EC market,  almost  all (more  than 95 percenr,
clothing  are  supplied  by the  above  three  categories  of suppliers. Therefore,
it seems  reasonable  to disregard  in the  model  other  suppliers  whose  combined
share  is less  than  5  percent  in  either  market.
Thirdly, the LDC suppliers  are further  classified  according  to the
existence  of  binding  quotas  in the  two  markets: (i)  LDCs  which  are  restricted
by the binding quotas  of both the U.  S. and the EC;  (_i) LDCs which are
restricted  by the  binding  quotas  of  the  U.S.  but  not  of the  EC;  (iii)  LDC  which
are  restricted  by the  binding  quotas  of  the  EC  but  not  of the  U.S.;  and  (iv)  LDC
which  are  not  restricted  by the  binding  quotas.
Figure  1 shows  a diagrammatic  expression  of the basic  framework  of the
model.
Figure  1: FRAMEWORK  OF THE  MODEL
(Market)  United Sta7tesL
(Suppliers)  G  X
Note  GI  - the  United  States
G2 - the  EC
G3 - LDCs  restricted  by the  binding  quotas  in the  two  markets.
G4  - LDCs  restricted  by the  binding  quotas  in the  US but not  in the  EC.
Gs  - LDCs  restricted  by the  binding  quotas  in the  EC  but  not in the  US.
G6  - Unrestricted  LDCs.5
2.  emand  Functions
Clothitag  products  from  diffecent  (groups  of)  countries  are  assumed  to  be
differentiated  products.  This  formulation  is  well  known as  Armington  assumption.
Since  each  product  is  an  imperfect  substitute  from  other  products,  the  quantity
demanded  of  the  product  is  affected  not  only  by  its  own  price  but  also  by  the
prices  of  other  products.  Since  we  have  6  categories  of  products,  we  have  12
demand  functions  (6 in  each  market)  in  the  model.  Ir.  order  to  simplify  the








(2)  QD,Fc  - b,,  +  Z  bi.  PDJEc, (i  - 1,  2  .... ,  6)
j-1
where  QD,  and  PD,  are  quantity  of  demand  for  product  i  si.e.  product  of  supplying
country  group  i)  and  tariff-inclusive  demand  price  of  product  i,  respectively.
Superscripts  (US  or  EC)  denote  the  market.  Note  that,  since  we  have  6  groups
of  suppliers  in  the  model,  equations  (1)  and  (2)  determine  twelve  demand
functions.
3.  SupDlY  Functions
As mentioned  above,  we have  6 categories  of  suppliers.  The  supply  function
of  each  supplier  is  characterized  as  follows:
(3)  QSi - c;  +  d 1 PS,,  (i  - 1,  2  ...  . ,  6)6
where QS, and PS, are  the supply  quantity  of product i and supply  price
(exclusive  of tariff  and  quota  premium)  of product  i, respectively.  In  order
to keep the simplicity  of the rodel,  the supply  functions  are also  given in
linear  form. Although  the  basic  formulation  of  the  nodel  is  thus  simple,  as  will
be discussed  later,  it turns  out to be so powerful  that it serves  for the
analysis  of various effects of the MFA, including  trade diversion  toward
unrestricted  market and so-called  spillover  to the unrestricted  developing
countries.
4. Eguilibrium  under  the  MFA  quotas  and tariffs
Once  we characterize  the  demand  and supply  behavior,  it is very easy  to
derive  equilibrium  conditions  of the  model.  First  of all, since  the  quantity
demanded  must  be equal  with  quantity  supplied  in  equilibrium,  the  equation  (4)
holds  in  all  equilibria  (e.g.  quota  equilibrium,  free  trade  equilibrium).  Note
that  equation  (4)  represents  six equilibrium  conditions  because  we have six
groups  of suppliers.
(4)  QD  US + QD EC - QS;,  (i  - 1,  2  .... ,  6)
In  other  words,  in  equilibrium,  the  quantity  supplied  by  each  group  must  be  equal
to the  sum  of demands  for  the  product  in  the  U.S.  market  and the  EC  market.
Since  we  are  ignoring  transportation  cost  in  the  model,  demand  prices  (PD 1)
are  equal  with  supply  prices  (PS,)  in  free  trade  equilibrium.  But,  when  tariffs
and/or  quotas  exist,  the  demand  prices  are  higher  than  the  supply  prices  by the
tariff  rate  and/or  by the  quota  markup. In this  paper,  subscript  i in  PD;,  PS 1,
QD 1, QS 1 stands  for  the  price  or  quantity  of the  product  supplied  tb the  producer
in country  group  Gi in Figure  1 above.  Therefore,  foUlnwing  conditions  hold
between  the demand  prices  and supply  prices  in the equilibrium  with the  MFA
quotas  and  tariffs.7
US  MARKET>
(5)  PD1U"  - PSi
(6)  PD2U" - (l+tUS)  PS2
(7)  PD½U9  - (l+tus)(l+mUS)  PS3
(8)  PD4U  - (l+tUS)(l+mUS)  PS4
(9)  PD 5
1" - (1+tUW)  PS,
(10)  PD6U 1 - (1+tU) PS6
<EC MARKET>
(11)  PD 1EC _  (l+tEC)  PS 1
(12)  PD 2EC  _ PS 2
(13)  PD%EC  - (l+tC)(l+mEc)  PS3
(14)  PD 4EC  _ (l+tEC)  PS4
(15)  PD,EC  _ (l+tEC)(l+MEC)
(16)  PD 6EC  _ (l+tEC)  pS6
where tus  and tEC  are tariff rate imposed  on clothing in the  United States  and in
the  EC,  respectively,  and  mus  and  mEC  are  price  markups  due  to  the  MFA  quotas  in
the  U.S.  and  in the  EC,  respectively.  For  example,  Figure  2 represents  such  a
price gap when quotas are in effect.  Namely, when the amount of imports is
restricted  at Q  (less  than the  amount  of imports  under  no quota),  the  demand
prtce  (PD)  is  higher  than  the  supply  pr_ce  (PS). As e::plained  in  detail  below,
m's (the  degree  of price  markup)  are  considered  to  be endogenous  variables  in
the  (theoretical)  model  because  they  are influenced  by the  quota  level,  but in
the  actual  estimation  I  used  the  previously  estimated  values  of  m's  and  therefore
I  treat  m's as  being  exogenous.Eigure  2:  AN EQUILIBRIUM  UNDER  QUOTA
p
PD  - - - -/ 
PF  - - - - - - - -
PS  - - -
D
0  Q  QF  Q
As mentioned  earlier,  (see  Figure  1)  GI is the  United  States,  and the
demand  price  of its  product  in  the  EC  market  is  higher  than  the  supply  price  by
the  tariff  rate  of  the  EC  while  in  the  U.S.  market  the  demand  price  is the  same
as the  supply  price. G2 is  the  EC,  and  the  demand  price  of its  product  in the
U.S. market  is higher  than the  supply  price  by the  tariff  rate of the  Urited
States  while  in  the  EC  market  the  demand  price  is  the  same  as the  supply  price.
G3 is  the  group  of the  LDCs  which  are  restrir  ed by the  binding  quotas  both in
the  U.S.  market  and  in  the  EC  markets,  and  its  demand  prices  in  the  both  markets
are  higher  by the  tariff  rate  and  by the  price  markup  due to the  MFA quotas.
G4 is  the  group  of the  LDCs  which  are  restricted  in  the  U.S.  market  alone,  and
therefore  the  demand  price  of its  product  in  the  U.S.  market  is  higher  than  its9
supply  price  by the  U.S. tariff  rate  and  by the  quota  markup  while in the EC
market  the  difference  is  only  by the  EC  tariff  rate. G5 is  the  group  of  the  LDCs
which  are  restricted  in  the  EC  market  alone,  and  therefore  the  demand  price  cf
its  product  in  the  EC market  is  higher  than  its  supply  price  by the  EC tariff
rate  and  quota  premium  while  in  the  U.S.  market  the  difference  between  the  demand
price  and  supply  price  is  only  by the  U.S.  tariff  rate. G6  is  the  group  of the
LDCs which  are  not  restricted  by the  binding  quotas  in  either  market,  and  the
demand  prices  in  each  market  is  higher  than  the  supply  price  only  by the  tariff
rate.
The  above system of equations (equation  (1) through equation (16))
completes  the  model. By  using  the  above  equilibrium  conditions,  the  model  can
be solved  for  the  following  34  endogenous  variables. In the  equilibrium  under
the  HFA  quota,  the  endogenous  variables  in the  model  are  as  follows:
(quantity  demanded)  QD 1US, QD 2Us,  QD 5US, QD 6 I  aD 1 ,  QD2  QD 4 C,  QD 6
(quantity  supplied) QS 1, QS 2, QS 3, QS 4, QS 5, QS 6
(demand  price)  PD 1us,  PD 2Us,  PD 3Us,  PD 4us,  PD 5Us,  PD 6Us,
pDEC  pDEC  PDEC  PDEC  PDEC  PDEC P1  P2'  P3  P4',  P5',  P6
(supply  price)  PS 1,  PS2,  PS3,  PS4,  PS 5, PS6,
(quota  markup)  MUS,  mEC.
Note  that  QD 3Us,  QD 4US,  QD 3EC, and  QD  EC  are  exogenously  given  by the  amount  of the
binding  MFA quotas. Further  note that,  while  m's are  endogenous  variables  in
the  model,  they  will  be treated  as  exogenous  variables  in  the  actual  estimation,
as  mentioned  above.10
5. Eguilibrium  after  Trade  Liberalizatign
Once  we  have  a  wsic framework  (i.e.  equilibrium  conditions  in  the  current
situation  where  the  MFA quotas  and tariffs  are existent),  it is very easy to
conduct  various  analyses  based on comparative  statics.  In this paper, the
effects  of four hypothetical  cases of trade liberalization  are empirically
analyzed  by using  the  framework  presented  above.
(Case  1)  the  Removal  of  MFA  guotas  by the  U.S.  and  the  EC
In this case,  mus  - 0 and mE - 0 should  be added to the above
equilibrium  conditions.
(Case  2)  the  Removal  of  MFA  guotas  by the  U.S.  only
In this case,  mUs  - 0 should  be added  to the above equilibrium
conditions.
(Case  3)  the  Removal  of  MFA  guotas  by the  EC only
In this case,  mw  - 0 should  be added  to the above  equilibrium
con.ditions.
(Case  4)  the  Removal  of  MFA  auotas  and  tariffs  by the  U.S.  and  the  EC
In  this  case,  mUS  _ 0, mEC  _ 0, tUs  - 0,  and tEc  -0  should  be added
to the  above  equilibrium  conditions.
Therefore,  once  the  values  of all  parameters  in the  model  are determined,  the
estimation  of  the  effects  of the  trade  liberalization  (and  the  effects  of trade
rescrictions  like  the  MFA  and  tariffs)  is  surprisingly  easy  by using  the  simple
model  of  the  paper.
III.  DATA  AND  DETAILED  METHOD  OF ESTIMATION
As it is  clear  from  the  discussion  in  the  previous  section,  if  the  values
of  all coefficients  of  the equations and other exogenous variables are11
determined,  it  is  very  easy  to solve  the  model  either  in the  quota  equilibrium
or  non-quota  equilibrium.  Unfortunately,  however,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to
directly  obtain  the  values  of these  coefficients,  and therefore,  an indirect
method  was taken. Namely,  the  observed  values  of the  quantity  (QD's  and  QS's)
and the demand  price (PD's)  are assumed  to be equilibrium  values  of these
endogenous  variables  generated  by the  model  under  the  existing  MFA quotas  and
tariffs.  PS's are calculated  from PD's  after  discounted  by the tariff  rate
(actual  data)  and  by the  quota  markup  (borrowed  from  the  estimates  of  Hamilton
(1988)).  By  using  these  equilibrium  values  of  endogenous  variables,  coefficients
of  equations  in  the  model  can  be  indirectly  calculated.  The  detail  of  the  method
is  discussed  below.
1.  Country  Classification
First  of  all,  we  have  to  classify  many  supplying  countries  of  clothing  into
6  categories  (G 1 through  G6 in  Figure  1  above). By  definition,  G 1 and  G2  are  the
United States and the EC, respectively.  Each developing  country was classified
into  one of the remaining four categories (G 3 through  G6), depending on whether
it is restricted by the binding quotas in the U.S. market and the EC market.
As mentioned earlier, some  MFA quotas are not binding  while others are strictly
binding.  Therefore, the fact that  LDC A has a bilateral  MFA agreement with the
United  States  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  country  is  effectively
restricted in the U.S. market.  For example,  when the utilization of the quota
is very low, the quota is often unnecessary and non-binding.  And when  the
bilateral  agreement  covers  very limited  items,  it  would  be easy for  the  exporting
country to shift their shipment from restricted items to unrestricted items.
In  view of the above,  I classified  exporting  LDCs  not according  to the  mere
existence  of  bilateral  quotas  but  according  to  the  existence  of  binding  bilateral12
auotas,  taking  into  account  the  MFA  coverage  rate  and  the  quota  utilization  rate.
Table 3 and Table  4 give  background  data  for such  classification.  The first
column  of Table 3 lists  developing  countries  which  have bilateral  MFA quota
agreement  with the  United  States  in 1986,  and the second  column  of the  table
shows  the  value  of  shipments  of  clothing  to  the  United  States  in  1986. The  third
column  shows  the  "MFA  coverage",  which  is  defined  as the  ratio  of shipments  of
clothing  subject  to  HFA  restrictions  to  total  clothing  shipments  to the  United
States  (in  percent). For  example,  75 percent  of the  clothing  shipments  from
Bangladesh  was  subject  to  MFA  quotas  in  1986. Note  that,  while  the  MFA  coverage
is an indicator  of the  restrictiveness  of the  MFA  quotas  against  the  exporting
country,  the  high  value  of the  MFA  coverage  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the
country  is  severely  restricted  by  the  MFA  quotas. If  the  amount  of  the  MFA  quota
is  more than the  amount  the  country  can supply,  the  quota  is not  binding  and
often  meaningless.  The  fourth  column  of  the  table  shows  the  "utilization  rate",
which is defined  as the ratio  of actual  shipments  to MFA quota  amounts. For
example,  in Table 3, the utilizaticn  rate of China is 98.5 percent,  and
therefore,  quotas  against  Chinese  clothing  shipments  seems  strongly  binding,
while  the  utilization  rate  of,  say,  Maldives  is only 1.5  percent  and  she can
increase  her  shipment  drastically  under  the  current  quota  limitation  when  other
constraints  (mostly  supply  constraints)  were  removed. The  last (fifth)  column
of  the  table  shows  "binding  rate",  which  is  defined  as the  geometric  mean  of  "MFA
coverage"  and  "utilization  rate". In  order  to  take  into  account  both  the  degree
of the  product  coverage  of the  MFA  quotas  and  the  degree  of  utilization  of each
quota,  I  used the "binding  rate"  as a criterion  wnen developing  countries  are
classified  into  the  above  four  categories.  I  used  seventy  percent  as a  cut-off
point:  when  the  binding  rate  is  more  than  70  percent,  the  country  is  considered13
Table  3: U.S. IMPORTS  OF CLOTHING  FROM  RESTRICTED
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
Value  of  MFA  Utilization  Binding
Country  Shipment  Coverage'  Rateb  Ratec
($Million)  (X)  (X)  (X)
Bangladesh  173.1  75.0  93.9  83.9
Brazil  101.7  100.0  29.4  54.2
China  1,874.5  78.4  98.5  87.9
Colombia  48.9  99.4  27.9  52.7
Costa  Rica  146.6  14.6  67.0  31.3
Dominican  Republic  293.6  13.0  39.5  22.7
Egypt  5.5  0.0  0.0  0.0
Guatemala  20.7  0.0  0.0  0.0
Haiti  125.7  41.6  35.6  38.5
Hong  Kong  3,660.8  67.0  76.9  71.8
India  393.3  59.5  93.3  74.5
Indonesia  296.8  90.5  90.9  90.7
Korea  2,736.3  61.5  86.4  72.9
Macao  246.7  84.9  67.4  75.6
Malaysia  278.3  81.1  72.9  76.9
Maldives  9.6  1.1  1.5  1.3
Mauritious  96.1  38.2  80.8  55.6
Mexico  321.9  87.4  67.8  77.0
Nepal  34.5  65.7  65.5  65.6
Pakistan  102.0  90.0  89.4  89.7
Panama  29.4  0.0  0.1  0.0
Peru  18.3  0.0  0.0  0.0
Philippines  510.3  76.3  59.2  67.2
Romania  88.4  100.0  60.9  78.0
Singapore  409.7  93.5  74.4  83.4
Sri  Lanka  286.4  87.9  80.2  84.0
Taiwan  2,822.6  84.9  84.1  84.5
Thailand  224.6  68.4  83.9  75.8
Turkey  154.5  66.4  69.8  68.1
Uruguay  63.6  12.6  93.9  34.4
Yugoslavia  63.9  59.6  74.3  66.5
A/  The  ratio  of shipments  subject  to  MFA  restrictions  to  total  shipments.
k/  The  ratio  of actual  shipments  to  MFA quota  amounts.
/  Geometric  mean of "MFA  coverage"  and  "utilization  rate."
Source: World  Bank  computer  files  on  MFA and  UN Trade  Statistics.14
Table  4:  EC IMPORTS  OF CLOTHING  FROM  RESTRICTED
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
Value  of  MFA  Utilization  Binding
Shipment  Coveragea  Rateb  RateC
Country  ($Million)  (X)  (X)  (X)
Brazil  45.6  12.5  36.7  21.4
China  577.6  43.0  99.7  65.5
Colombia  4.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Egypt  16.7  22.2  29.7  25.7
Hong  Kong  2,095.2  87.5  75.9  81.5
India  454.3  68.9  58.3  63.4
Indonesia  56.9  50.0  75.4  61.4
Korea  1,187.7  70.1  83.2  76.4
Macao  345.4  85.4  88.0  86.7
Malaysia  99.7  32.6  41.1  36.6
Mexico  5.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
Pakistan  163.5  12.4  90.5  33.5
Peru  3.6  15.6  12.8  14.1
Philippines  146.5  61.8  57.6  59.7
Romania  355.9  61.9  81.2  70.9
Singapore  69.2  74.8  30.7  47.9
Sri  Lanka  102.9  43.5  81.6  59.6
Taiwan  501.6  79.4  79.0  79.2
Thailand  251.4  59.9  103.4  78.7
Uruguay  30.9  0.0  0.0  0.0
Yugoslavia  944.5  40.7  110.5  67.1
a/  The  ratio  of shipments  subject  to  MFA  restrictions  to total  shipments.
k/ The  ratio  of actual  shipments  to  MFA  quota  amosints.
_/ Geometric  mean  of "MFA  coverage"  and "utilization  rate."
Source: World  Bank  Computer  files  on  MFA and  UN Trade  Statistics.
to  be  effectively  restricted  by the  binding  quotas  of  the  United  States. For  example,
Bangladesh  (its  binding  rate  is  83.9  percent)  was  effectively  restricted  by the
U.S.  while,  say,  Costa  Rica  (31.3  percent)  was  not. Table  4 lists  the  equivalent
data  for  the  EC market.1S
By using  the  data  on the  binding  rate in Table  3 and Table  4, the
clothing  exporting  LDCs are  classified  into  4 groups.  The  complete  listing  of
the  countries  is given  in  Table  5  below.
Table  5:  CATEGORIES  OF CLOTHING  SUPPLIERS
Category  1  (G 1):  United  States
Category  2  (G2):  EC
Category  3  (G 3):  LDCs  effectively  restricted  by both the  U.S. and  EC
(Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Macao,  Romania,  Taiwan,  Thailand)
Category  4  (G,):  LDCs  effectively  restricted  by the  U.S. but not EC
(Bangladesh,  China, India, Indonesia,  Malaysia,
Mexico,  Pakistan,  Singapore,  Sri  Lanka)
Category  5  (G 5):  LDCs  effective  restricted  by EC but  not  by the  U.S.
(None)
Category  6  (G 6):  LDCs  effectively  restricted  by neither  the  U.S.  nor
EC (Brazil,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Dominican  Republic,
Egypt,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  Maldives,  Mauritius,  Nepal,
Panama,  Peru,  Philippines, Turkey,  Uruguay,
Yugoslavia,  other  LDCs  not  listed  in  this  table)
Note: For  criteria  of the  above  classification,  see  main  text.
2.  Coefficients  of  Demand  Functions
Note that,  when own-price  elasticities,  cross-price  elasticities,  and
observed  equilibrium  values  of  QD's  and  PD's  are  known,  we can  obtain  values  of
coefficients  of demand  functions  (a's  and  b's).
By differentiating  the  demand  function  of product  i in the  U.S. market
(i.e.  equation  (1))  with  respect  to  price  of  product  J,  we  obtain  the  following:
aQDj
(17) a  P  aDJ16
Rearranging  equation  (17),  we get  equation  (18).
QD 1
( 18)  a'J  - C'u  PDj
where  ew is  the  elasticity  of  product  i  with  respect  to  the  price  of  product  J,
which  is  defined  as  follows.
a QDI  PDj
(19)  Cy  *
a PDj  QD,
By  using  equation  (18),  we  can  obtain  aj  (  j  #  0  )  a  can  be  obtained  by
substituting  the  values  of  aq  (  j  #  0  )  and  values  of  quantity  and  price  into
each  demand  function.  By applying  the  same  technique  to  demand  functions  in  the
EC market  (equation  (2)),  the  values  of  b's  are  obtained.
In  reality,  however,  individual  own-price  elasticities  and  cross-price
elasticities  are  very  difficult  to  obtain,  therefore,  I  used  the  so-called
Armington  (1969)  technique  which  we  already  used  elsewhere  (see  Erzan,  Goto,
Holmes  (1990)).  By  using  the  Armington's  formulae,  we  can  derive  individual
elasticities  from  the  aggregate  elasticity  (  t7 ),  the  value  share  of  each  product
(S),  and  the  elasticity  of  substitution  (  o  )  By  assuming  CES functions,
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From  this  formulation,  it follows:
(21)  e6,  - (1S;)  a  + S 1t)
(22)  jj  - (Sj 1 - Sj  1  )
where  f,  is  own  price  elasticity  of  product  i,  and  6 eHj  is cross price
elasticity  of  product  i  with  respect  to  the  price  of  product  j.
By using  the above  method,  the  values  of all the  coefficients  of demand
functions  (a's  and  b's)  can  be  obtained  from  the  aggregate  demand  elasticity  (17),
the elasticity  of substitution  among  products  (a), the  value share  of each
product  (S 1),  and  the  quantity  observed  and  price  of  each  product  observed. SIs
were  calculated  from  actual  trade  data. I  used  q  - 0.282:  Houthakker  (1965)'s
estimate  which  is  used  in  the  studies  by  Tarr-Morkre  (1984)  and  by Erzan,  Goto,
Holmes  (1990). I set  a - 3,  which  is  the  same  as our  above-mentioned  previous
study  (a-3).
Of course,  the reasonable  value of a  is very difficult  to determine.
Although  I  used  3.0  here,  other  studies  used  different  values. For  example,  in
the  above-mentioned  study  by Trela  and  Whalley  much  higher  value  (a  - 5.0)  was
used  while  Suphachalasai  (1989)  used  very  low  value (a  - 1.0).  None  of these
values  was obtained  from a rigorous  estimation. In view of this,  I made a
sensitivity  analysis,  which is reported  later  in the paper.  As will become
clearer,  the  results  based  on the  model  in this  paper  are  surprisingly  stable
(i.e.  insensitive  to  the  value  of  a).
From the above  data,  all of the coefficients  of demand  functions  were
ca'.culated.18
3.  Coefficients  of Supnly  Functions
The  coefficients  of  supply  functions  can  be  obtained  much  more  easily  than
those  of demand  functions.  The  coefficients  (c;  and  di  in  equation  (3))  can  be
obtained  when supply  elasticities  and observed  equilibrium  values  of QS 1 and
PSi are  obtained. First  of all,  QS 1 is  just  summation  of QD  US  and  QD  EC.  Ps
can  be calculated  from  values  of PDi,  t , t , mus,  and  mEC.  For  the  tariff  rate
I used the  actual  data,  and  set tus  and tEC  as 0.207 (20.7  percent)  and  0.134
(13.4  percent),  respectively. For the quota markup  rate, I used Hamilton
(1988)'s  estimate,  and  set  mu and  miC  as 0.195  and  0.107,  respectively.  Once
PS,  is calculated  by these  data,  coefficients  of supply  functions  (c;  and d,)
can  be obtained  as soon  as the  elasticity  of supply  is  specified.
By  differentiating  the  supply  functions  of  product  i (i.e.,  equation  (3))
with  respect  to  the  supply  price  of the  product  (PS,),  we obtain  the  following.
QS 1
(23)  aps  - d
Rearranging  equation  (23),  we get  equation  (24).
QS 1
(24)  di  - ej
where ej  is the elasticity of supply of product i (or country group i),  which
is defined as follows.
a QS 1 PSi
(25)  e 1 a Psi  QS 1
By using equation (24)  we can obtain the  values of d's.  c's can be obtained by
substituting  the  values of d's and  vaules of quantity  and  price into  each supply
function.  For the value of supply elasticities I used 2 here.  The result of19
the  main  estimate  using  the  parameter  values  reported  above  are  presented  in  the
next  section.  But,  it  seems  extremely  difficult  to  get  reliable  estimate  of the
values  of  supply  elasticities,  as  well  as  elasticity  of  substitution,  therefore,
for  the  purpose  of sensitivity  analysis,  I  reported  the  comparable  results  when
all  supply  elasticities  are  set  to infinity.
IV. RESULTS  OF ESTIMATION 1
The general  equilibrium  trade  model discussed  above has been used to
analyze  the  effects  of  various  scenarios  of  liberalization  of  the  clothing  trade.
As shown  below,  by using  the  data  in  1986,  the  estimation  (simulation)  was  made
for  the  following  four  scenarios:  (i)  simultaneous  removal  of the  MFA  quotas  by
the  U.S. and  EC; (ii)  unilateral  removal  of the  !4FA  quotas  by the  U.S.; (iii)
unilateral  removal  of the  MFA quotas  by the  EC;  and (iv)  simultaneous  removal
of the  MFA  quotas  and  tariffs  by the  U.S.  and  EC.  For  each  set  of estimation,
the  effect  on  each  group  of  exporting  LDCs  as  well  as  domestic  producers  in  the
developed  country  are  report  d. At the  end  of this  section,  the  long  run  effect
derived  by the  model  assuming  infinite  supply  elasticities  is  also  reported.
1. Simultaneous  Removal  of the  MFA  Ouota
As shown  above,  many countries  have been restricted  by the  binding  MFA
quotas. According  to  Hamilton  (1988),  due  to  the  MFA  quotas,  the  domestic  price
of clothing  in the  U.S. (in  the EC) is 19.5% (10.7%)  higher  than  otherwise.
Table  6 is i  summary  of results  of our estimation  on the  change  in clothing
trade.
1  The  magnitude  of  our  results  of  change  in  trade  is  generally  smaller  than
the result  by Trela and Whalley  (1988).  There  are several  sources  for the
difference,  including:  (i)  the  simplification  adopted  by Trela  and  Whalley  that
all quotaa  were binding;  (ii)  the  parameter  value  used for the import  demand
elasticity  (0.28  in  the  present  paper  versus  0.6);  (iii)  the  parameter  value  used
for  the  elasticity  of substitution  (3.0  here  versus  5.0).20
Table  6:  EFFECTS  OF LIBERALIZATION  OF CLOTHING  TRADE
Case  1:  Simultaneous  Removal  of  Ouotas
by the  U.S.  and  the  EC
Current
Suppliers  Value  of  Value  Change  Quantity
Shipment  Change
($  Million)  (5 Million)  (%)  (*)
G1 53,172.3  -3,325.9  -6.3  -4.2
G2 1,640.0  -196.0  -12.0  -11.7
G3 9,779.6  728.0  7.4  19.3
G4 4,135.9  408.0  9.9  24.3
G65  2,331.0  -210.0  -9.0  -8.3
(Total  Imports)  17,886.6  730.2  4.1  16.5
SC  MARKET
G,t  149.0  4.3  2.9  5.1
G2 39,706.1  -216.6  -0.5  -0.2
G3 4,737.2  199.1  *4.2  7.2
G4  1,549.4  -208.3  -13.4  -18.0
G6  6,272.1  16.7  0.3  1.0
(Total  Imports)  12,707.7  11.9  0.1  0.1
TOTAL
G.  53,321.3  -3,321.6  -6.2  -4.2
G2  41,346.1  -412.6  -1.0  -0.7
G3  14,516.9  927.3  6.4  15.2
G4 5,685.3  199.8  3.5  11.2
G6 8,603.1  -193.3  -2.2  1.5
Note:  G1 - U.S.A.
G2 - EC10.
G3 - LDCs  which  are  restricted  by binding  quotas  of US and  EC.
G4  - LDCs  which  are  restricted  by  binding  quotas  of  US alone.
G6  - LDCs  which  are  not  restricted  by binding  quota.21
if  all  existing  MFA  quotas  were  removed.  Note  that,  as  observed  in  the  previous
section,  in 1986  there  are  no developing  countries  which  are  restricted  by the
binding  quotas  of  the  EC  but  not  by  the  U.S. (G,),  so  G,  is  omitted  in  the  tables
in this  section.
First  of  all,  it  should  be  noted  that  due  to  the  MFA  the  shipments  from
G3 countries  (LDCs  which  are  restricted  by  the  binding  quotas  of  the  U.S.  and  EC)
are  severely  restricted.  According  to  our  estimation,  if  all  the  MFA  quotas  were
removed  the  value  of  their  shipments  would  increase  by  almost  one  billion  dollars
while shipments  of the U.S. and EC would decline  by $3.3  billion and $0.4
billion,  respectively. The increase  of shipments  from G. countries  is more
significant  in the U.S. market  than in the EC market,  because  as Hamilton's
estimate  suggests,  the  restrictiveness  in  the  U.S.  market  is  stronger  than  that
in  the  EC in the  1980s.
Secondly,  our estimation  result  suggests  that so-called  "spillover"
effect  of the  MFA is  not  so large  as sometimes  alleged. As summarized  by Goto
(1989)  in  detail,  because  of the  discriminatory  nature  of  MFA  quotas,  which  are
different  from  global  quotas  permitted  under  GATT  article  19,  some  unrestricted
developing  countries  benefit from the MFA.  It is often alleged that the
magnitude  of  the  spillover  effect  is  large.  For  example,  Keesing  and  Wolf  (1980)
presented  data from the late 1950s  and 1960s  as evidence  of the spillover:
Immediately  after  Japan  announced  a  VER  on  shipments  to  the  United  States,  Hong
Kong  dramatically  increased  shipments  to fill  the  gap.  But,  our  estimate  for
the  year  1986  suggests  that  the  magnitude  of  the  spillover  effect  is  not  as  large
as often  alleged. As Table  6  shows,  due  to  the  MFA  quotas  on  other  developing
countries,  the  value  of  apparel  shipments  from  unrestricted  developing  countries22
(G,  countries)  in the  U.S. market  is larger  by only  $200  million  (9  percent).
When the two markets  are taken together,  the so-called  spillover  effect  to
unrestricted  suppliers  is  just  a little  more  than  2  percent  of their  shipment.
2.  Unilateral  Removal  of the  M.FA  Ouotag
What  would  happen  if  MFA  quotas  of  only  one  market  (either  the  U.S.  or  EC)
were  removed?  It  is  expected  that  if  only  one  market  is  restricted,  the  increase
in imports  in the  unrestricted  market  is  bigger  than  in the  case  of unilateral
liberalization. It is sometimes  argued  that during  the period  under  HFA I
(January  1974-December  1977), the EC's imports of  textiles  and  clothing
dramatically  increased  because exports of  these products from developing
countries  shifted  to  the  EC  market  from  the  United  States,  where  a  comprehensive
system  of bilateral  restrictions  had  been  set  up in 1971.
It  is  estimated,  however,  that  the  increase  in  imports  of  clothing  is  not
as  dramatic  as  often  alleged,  even  if  MFA  quotas  were  removed  only  in  one  of  the
two  markets. Table  7 is a summary  of estimation  when only  the  United  States
abolished  the  HFA  quotas,  while  Table  8  is  a  summary  of  estimation  when  only  the
EC abolished  the  MFA  quotas.
As Table  7  shows,  when  only  the  United  States  removed  its  MFA  quotas,  the
increase  in the  value  of  U.S. clothing  imports  would  be 0.76  billion  dollars,
which  is  not  very different  from  the  increase  when simultaneous  quota  removal
were  realized. On the  other  hand,  the  unilateral  quota  removal  by the  EC  would
have  a little  stronger  impact  on the  EC clothing  imports  than  the  simultaneous
quota  removal  (see  Table  3). But,  even  in  this  case,  the  increase  in  the  value
of clothing  imports  by the  EC  would  be only  0.3  billion  dollars.23
IAhJ,.7:  EFFECTS  OF  LIURAlIZATION  OF  CLOTHINC  TRADE
Case  2: Unilateral  Removal  of  Ouotar  by  the  U.S.
Current
Suppliers  Value  of  Value  Chan  p  Quantity
Shipment  Change
(S Million)  ($  Million) (%)  (%)
U.S.  MARKET
C.,  53,172.3  -3,656.7  -6.9  -4.7
G,  1,640.0  -242.5  -14.8  -15.1
G0  9,779.6  892.7  9.1  23.7
G,,  4,135.9  364.5  8.8  23.0
J,  2,331.0  -259.2  -11.1  *10.9
(Total  Imports)  17,886.6  755.6  4.2  18.1
EC  MARKET
G 1 149.0  10.5  7.1  9.6
G2  39,706.1  742.1  1.9  1.5
Gs  4,737.2  -424.1  -9.0  -13.6
G4  1,549.4  -148.4  -9.6  -14.5
G6  6,272.1  196.1  3.1  3.4
(Total  Imports)  12,707.7  -365.8  -2.9  -6.6
TOTAL
G1  53,321.3  -3,646.2  -6.8  -4.6
G2  41,346.1  499.6  1.2  0.8
Gs  14,516.9  468.6  3.2  10.9
G,,  5,685.3  216.1  3.8  11.4
G6  8,603.1  -63.1  -0.7  -0.5
Note:  G, - J.S.A.
G2  - EC1O.
G3 - LDCs  which  are  restricted  by  binding  quotas  of  U.S.  and  EC.
G4  - LDCs  which  are  restricted  by  binding  quotas  of  US  alone.
G6  - LDCs  which  are  not  restricted  by  binding  quota.24
Table  8:  EFFECTS  OF LIBERALIZATION  OF CLOTHING  TRADE
Case 3: Unilateral  Removal  of  Ouotas  by the  EC
Current  Value  Change
Suppliers  Value  of  Quantity
Shipment  Change
($  Million)  ($  Million)  (X)  (X)
ES 
G,  53,172.3  374.3  0.7  0.5
G2  1,640.0  45.3  2.8  3.5
G3  9,779.6  -272.5  -2.8  -4.6
G4  4,135.9  53.7  1.3  1.4
G,6  2,331.0  48.8  2.1  2.6
(Total  Imports)  17,886.6  -124.7  -0.7  -1.7
EC  MARKET
GI  149.0  -6.2  -4.2  -4.4
C 2 39,706.1  -912.8  -2.3  -1.6
G3 4,737.2  499.6  10.5  20.1
G 4 1,549.4  -55.3  -3.6  -3.5
G6 6,272.1  -172.7  -2.8  -2.3
(Total  Imports)  12,707.7  265.3  2.1  6.4
TOTAL
Gl  53,321.3  368.1  0.7  0.5
G2 41,346.1  -867.5  -2.1  -1.4
G3  14,516.9  227.1  1.6  3.9
CG  5,685.3  -1.7  -0.0  -0.1
C6 8,603.1  -123.9  -1.4  -1.0
Note:  GC - U.S.A.
G2 - EC10.
G3 - LDCs  which  are  restricted  by binding  quotas  of  U.S.  and  EC.
G4 - LDCs  which  are  restricted  by binding  quotas  of  US alone.
G, - LDCs  which  are  not  restricted  by binding  quota.25
3. Removal  of Ouotas  and  Tariffs
As  noted  earlier,  clothing  trade  is  restricted  not  only  by  the  MFA  quotas  but  also
by high tariffs.  As summarized  in Goto (1989),  the tariff  rate on textiles  and
clothing  after  the  Tokyo  round  of  GATT  negotiations  is  almost  three  times  higher  than
that  on  manufactured  goods  as  a  whole. Moreover,  during  the  Tokyo  round,  tariff  rates
on  textile  and  clothing  were  not  reduced  as  much  as  the  rates  on  manufactured  products.
In  the  1980s,  the  average  tariff  rates  on  clothing  in  the  U.S.  and  EC  are  20.7  percent
and  13.4  percent,  respectively.
Table  9  shows  a  summary  of  our  estimate  of  change  in  clothing  trade  when  existing
quotas  and  tariffs  were  removed.  Because  of  the  high  tariffs  at  present,  the  magnitude
of the  change  is large.  Especially,  the  effect  of such liberalization  on the  U.S.
producers  is impressive. As Table 9 shows,  when all the tariffs  and quotas  were
removed,  the  value  of  clothing  shipments  by  the  U.S.  producers  would  decrease  by  almost
8  billion  dollars  (or  14.4X).
In other  word, the U.S. producers  are heavily  protected  by various  trade
restrictions.  Since  most  of clothing  is imported  from  the  developing  countries,  if
such  a comprehensive  trade  liberalization  were realized,  the  magnitude  of the  gains
by the  LDCs is  very large. When  the  two  markets  are taken  together,  the  LDCs  could
increase  their  clothing  shipments  by as  much  as $7.2  billion.
4. Sensitivity  Analvsis
(a)  SuRply  elasticity
As mentioned  in  Section  III,  in the  above  estimations  I  used 2.0  for  the  value
of supply  elasticities.  But,  in  the  long  run,  the  value  of  supply  elasticities  would
be  much  higher  than  2.0  because  over  time  various  adjustments,  including  foreign  direct
investment,  are  possible. In  view of this,  I have  made calculations  using  extreme
value  (infinity)  for  supply  elasticities.  Table  10  gives  the  comparable  results  when
all  supply  elasticities  are  set  to  infinity.26
T-ble  9:  EFFECTS  OF LIBERALIZATION  OF CLOTHING  TRADE
Case  4:  Simultaneous  Removal  of Out%as  and  Tariffs
by the  U.S.  and  EC
Current  Value  Change
Suppliers  Value  of  Quantity
Shipment  Change
($  Million)  ($  Million)  (%)  (
U.S.  MARKET
GI  53,172.3  -7,636.1  -14.4  -10.0
G2  1,640.0  383.7  23.4  24.9
G0  9,779.6  3,035.8  31.0  36.2
G,  4,135.9  1,351.9  32.7  40.3
G6  2,331.0  430.8  18.5  11.7
(Total  Imports)  17,886.6  5,202.3  29.1  34.3
EC  MARKET
G,  149.0  51.2  34.3  41.3
G2  39,706.1  -1,865.6  -4.7  -3.5
G3  4,737.2  1,072.4  22.6  18.1
G"  1,549.4  95.1  6.1  -6.1
G6 6,272.1  1,195.2  19.1  12.3
(Total  Imports)  12,707.7  2,413.9  19.0  11.7
TOQAL
GI  53,321.3  -7,584.9  -14.2  -9.8
G2 41,346.1  -1,481.8  -3.6  -2.4
Gs  14,516.9  4,108.2  28.3  30.0
G4  5,685.3  1,447.0  25.5  26.0
G6 8,603.1  1,626.0  18.9  12.1
Note:  GG  - U.S.A.
G2  - EC1O.
G3  - LDCs  which  are  restricted  by binding  quotas  of  U.S.  and  EC.
G4 - LDCs  which  are  restricted  by binding  quotas  of  US alone.
G6  - LDCs  which  are  not  restricted  by binding  quota.27
IdLl&N:  LONG-RUN  EFFECTS  OF LIERALIZATION  OFCLOTNING  TRADE
(Infinite  Supply  Eltaticity  Case)
Current  Value  Rovsl  of  Quotas  RinVml of  Quotas  wnd Tariffs
SuWpLiers  of  Shipmnt  Value  Cham  Quantity  Value  ChaI_  Quentity
(ON)  ()  M  (X)  (SN)  (X)  (X)
U.S.  UARKET
a,  53,172.3  -5,287.5  -9.9  -9.9  -11,528.6  *21.7  -21.7
G2  1,640.0  -163.6  -10.0  -10.0  487.2  29.7  29.7
C3  9,779.6  1,591.S  16.3  38.9  4,153.4  42.5  70.1
G
0 4,135.9  673.4  16.3  38.9  1,756.9  42.5  70.2
G6  2,331.0  -232.3  -10.0  -10.0  691.7  29.7  29.7
(Total  Iports)  17,886.6  1,869.0  10.4  31.6  7,089.2  39.6  64.1
EC PKT
G1  149.0  -3.9  -2.6  -2.6  36.7  24.6  24.7
G 2 39,706.1  -1,031.9  -2.6  -2.6  -4.298.5  -10.8  -10.8
GS  4,737.2  669.4  14.1  26.3  1,686.8  35.6  50.0
X  1,549.4  -41.2  -2.7  -2.7  380.1  24.5  24.5
06  6,272.1  -163.3  -2.6  -2.6  1,540.1  24.6  24.5
(Total  Imports)  12,707.7  461.1  3.6  9.0  3,643.8  28.7  34.7
T:OTAL
61  53,321.3  -5,291.4  -9.9  -9.9  -11,491.9  -21.6  -21.5
02  41,346.1  -1,195.5  -2.9  -2.9  -3,811.3  -9.2  -9.2
03  14,516.9  2,260.9  15.6  34.6  5,840.2  40.2  63.2
G4  5,685.3  632.2  11.1  26.1  2,137.0  37.6  56.0
G6  8,603.1  -395.6  -4.6  -4.6  2,231.8  25.9  25.9
Note  01  - U.S.A
02  - ECIO.
G 3 - LDCs  which are  restricted  by binding quotas of  U.S.  *nd  EC.
- LOCs  which are  restricted  by binding  quotas of  US  alone.
G 6 - LDCs  which are  not  restricted  by binding  quote.
As  this  table  shows,  the  magnitude  of  the  long  run  effects  is  much  larger  than
the  above  (short-run)  estimates.  For  example,  when  simultaneous  quota  removal
by  the  U.S.  and  EC were  realized,  the  value  of  imports  in  the  U.S.  and  in  the
EC would  increase  almost  $2  billion  and  $500  million,  respectively.  If  all  the
quotas  and  tariffs  were  removed,  the  value  of  clothing  exports  from  LDC would28
increase  by $10  billion  (or  by 35.4  percent). On the  other  hand,  the  shipments
by the  domestic  producers  in  the  U.S.  and  EC  would  dramatically  decrease.
(b) Elasticity  of Substitution  (a)
In addition  to the supply  elasticity,  the vale  of the elasticity  of
substitution  among  differentiated  products  is also  controversial.  As pointed
out  earlier,  the  elasticity  values  used  in  the  previous  studies  vary  very  much.
For  example,  Trela  and  Whalley  (1988)  used  very  high  value  (5.0),  but they  did
not  provide  sensitivity  analysis. On the  other  hand,  Suphachalasai  (1988)  used
very  low  value  (1.0).  He also  reported  the  estimation  results  based  on  the  high
value  used  by Trela  and  Whalley,  and  he admitted  that  the  results  based  on  his
model  varied  widely  depending  on the  values  of elasticity  of substitution.
In view of the fact that there  has been no reliable  estimate  of the
elasticity  of substitution  among  clothing  products  from  different  countries,  I
also conducted  a sensitivity  analysis  on it.  The result  of the sensitivity
analysis  is  given  in  Table  11  below.  In the  table,  three  sets  of estimations
of the  effects  of simultaneous  removal  of the  MFA quota  are  reported. As this
table  shows,  on average,  the  results  obtained  from  the  model  in this  paper  is
fairly  stable  (i.e.,  they  do not fluctuate  widely  depending  on the  values  of
elasticity  of substitution).  For  example,  the  so-called  spillover  effect  for
unrestricted  LDCs  (C 6) is less  than  3  percent  even  if  I  used  very  high  value  of
a (5.0).
V. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
In this  paper,  I  have  developed  a simple  general  equilibrium  trade  model
for  the  analysis  of the  MFA,  which  consists  of  two  markets  (the  U.S.  and  the  EC)
and  6  grcups  of  supplying  countries.  Although  the  structure  of  the  model  is  very29
IWLL11: EFFECTS  OF  SINULTANEOUS  NOAL  OF  SOTAS
BY  TNE  U.S. AND  TNE  EC
(A Senaitivlty  Anatysi.)
Current  Value Chwn  CS  N)  Value Chana  MX
SiuLhrs  Value  of
Shipnnt  ou2  o-3  0=5  a-2  ou3  was
U.S.  NAIKMT
a,  53,172.3  -2,531.6  -3,325.9  -4,349.4  -4.8  -6.3  - 8.2
02  1,640.0  -119.2  -196.0  -364.1  -7.3  -12.0  -22.2
03  9,779.6  281.5  728.0  1,318.4  2.9  7.4  13.3
G4  4,13S.9  152.4  406.0  628.6  3.7  9.9  20.0
06  2,331.0  -135.0  -210.0  -36S.2  -5.8  -9.0  -15.7
(Totat  17,886.6  179.7  730.2  1,417.8  1.0  4.1  7.9
iq3rts)
EC  NARKET
GI  149.0  0.9  4.3  13.8  0.6  2.9  9.3
G2  39,706.1  -250.8  -216.6  -44.3  -0.6  -0.5  -0.1
G 3 4,737.2  129.7  199.1  211.7  2.7  4.2  4.5
G4  1,549.4  -95.2  -208.3  -466.9  -6.1  -13.4  -30.1
C6  6,272.1  -21.3  16.7  133.6  -0.3  0.3  2.1
(Total  12,707.7  14.2  11.9  -107.8  0.1  0.1  -0.8
Iwports)
TOTAL
GI  53,321.3  -2,530.7  -3,321.6  -4,335.5  -4.7  -6.2  -8.1
G2  41,346.1  -370.0  -412.6  -408.4  -0.9  -1.0  -1.0
G3  14,516.9  411.2  927.3  1,530.2  2.8  6.4  10.5
G4  5,685.3  57.1  199.8  361.7  1.0  3.5  6.4
G6 8,603.1  -156.2  -193.3  -231.6  -1.8  -2.2  -2.7
simple,  it  is  powerful  for  the  analysis  of  various  effects  of  the  MFA,  including
trade  suppressing  effect,  trade  diversion  effect  among  markets,  and so-called
spillover  effect.30
After developing  the  model,  the  model  has  beon applied  to the clothing
trade  in  1986. Clothing  suppliers  are  classified  into  6 groups:  (i)  the  U.S.;
(ii)  the  EC;  (iii)  LDCs  restricted  by  the  binding  quotas  of  the  U.S.  and  EC;  (iv)
LDCs  restricted  by the  binding  quotas  of the  U.S.  but  not  by the  EC; (v)  LDCs
restricted  by the  binding  quotas  of  the  EC  but  .ot  by  the  U.S.;  (vi)  unrestricted
LDCs. By  using  the  model,  various  scenarios  of  liberalization  of  clothing  trade
have been analyzed:  (i) simultaneous  removal  of MFA quotas;  (ii)  unilateral
removal  of  MFA quotas  by either  the  U.S.  on EC; (iii)  simultaneous  removal  of
MFA quotas  and  tariffs.
Estimation  (simulation)  results  suggest  that  the  major  beneficiary  of  the
lFA  is the  domestic  producer  in the  importing  developed  countries. Due  to the
MFA the  value  of shipments  of clothing  by the  U.S. producers  is more than  $3
billion  higher  ($400  million  for the  EC producers)  than  otherwise. When MFA
quotas  and tariffs  are taken  together,  the  value  of clothing  shipments  by the
U.S. producers  is $8 billion  higher ($1.5  billion  for the  EC producers)  than
under  no such  restrictions.
Different  from  the  spillover  to  domestic  producers  in  developed  countries,
the spillover  to  unrestricted  developing  countries  is  much smaller  than  often
alleged. It  is  estimated  that  such  spillover  effect  of the  MFA to  unrestricted
LDCs  is less  than  $200  million  (or  2.2  percent  of the  value  of shipment  by the
unrestricted  LDCs). On the  other  hand  the  magnitude  of  trade  suppressing  effect
on the  restricted  LDCs (such  as Hong  Kong  and  Korea)  is  much larger  than that
of  spillover.  Due  to  the  MFA,  the  value  of  the  clothing  exports  from  restricted
LDCs  is suppressed  by more  than  $1  billion  even  in the  short  run.  In the  long31
run,  when  all  the  adjustmnts  are  sade  (i.e.  infinite  supply elasticities),  the
value  of the  lost  shipiunt  of the  restricted  LDCs  due  to the  MFA is  more than
$2  billion.
Needless  to  say,  as  most  other  estimates,  the  results  of the  estimates  in
this  paper  depend  very  much on the  chosen  values  of parameters  such  as supply
elasticities  and  elasticity  of  substitution  among  differentiated  products.  But,
as  Table  10 and  Table  11 show,  main  themes  of the  results  remain  even  when  we
pick  up extreme  value  of the  par  ame  ters.32
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